Global News Freightwaves Why Strait of Hormuz maritime access
is also its biggest weakness

Stuart Chirls, Friday, March 13, 2026
Original Article: https://www.freightwaves.com/news/why-strait-of-hormuz-maritime-access-is-also-its-biggest-weakness
Articles Reproduced by Permission of FreightWaves

The Port of Jebel Ali, Dubai. (Photo: DP World)

Drewry: No good freight logistics alternatives to Persian Gulf passageway

Diversions by container carries away from the war-torn Strait of Hormuz expose the region’s structural vulnerability, a new analysis finds, as decades of underinvestment in bypasses severely limit the capacity of alternative logistics to absorb displaced cargo.

The narrow, winding Strait of Hormuz – the sea gateway Iran and the United Arab Emirates/Oman peninsula – has been a longtime source of concern regarding its potential closure. Connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, it’s a chokepoint for as much as 30% of global crude oil shipments moving by tanker, as well as critical shipments of liquefied natural and propane gas, petrochemicals and fertilizer for crops, notes Drewry Senior Associate Eirik Hooper, in a new report.

The disruption of the oil trade has already been felt in the United States, driving up the cost of diesel, while gas prices have risen by 70 cents at the pump. Liner operators have announced a range of emergency surcharges and rate hikes to account for the cost for diverting container ships away from the region.

While Persian Gulf ports only account for 3.5% of the global container trade, extended disruptions mean cargo will stack up at ports. This will affect supply chain fluidity as the overflow dominoes from the Gulf to ports in Asia, and eventually affects operations of U.S.-bound services. The Strait is critical as the only maritime gateway supplying the economies of Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq.

A total of 33 million twenty foot equivalent units (TEUs) move through the Gulf each year to UAE, Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Bahraini terminals. Jebel Ali in Dubai, the busiest hub, processes around 15.5 million TEUs annually.

The deep liner connectivity of the Abu Dhabi and Dubai hubs is evidenced by Drewry’s Q1 2026 Port Connectivity Index Scores for Jebel Ali (16.0) and Khalifa Port (9.4, the fastest-rising score in the region). Despite this strength, Hopper says, the region faces a major vulnerability: a Strait of Hormuz closure has resulted in the loss of over three-quarters of this vital connectivity.

Bypass port capacity

Drewry’s assessment of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s principal bypass ports found a collective latent container capacity of over 20 million TEUs, a substantial figure that is nonetheless heavily constrained by geography and logistics.

(* Salalah’s Gulf utility rated Very Low due to 1,700km+ overland distance to Dubai and absence of rail connection. Source: Drewry Maritime Research)

Unreliable relief valves

Khorfakkan, UAE, is the only port with genuinely high bypass utility, says Hooper, located 80 miles from Dubai via a two-lane highway. It can absorb some additional Dubai-bound volume, notes Hooper, with UAE authorities already implementing emergency customs clearance for direct road transfer to Jebel Ali and Abu Dhabi free zones. The road capacity is uncertain but likely a fraction of the port’s physical headroom.

Oman’s Salalah is a paradox, Hooper says, with 3 million TEUs of latent capacity but functionally disconnected as a Gulf supply chain bypass due to its 1000-mile road distance from Dubai and lack of rail. Trucking a 40-foot container from Salalah costs an estimated $3,000-$5,000, making it prohibitive compared to the $200-$400 drayage from Jebel Ali. While it can handle transshipment for East African and South Asian markets, its location still leaves it in striking distance of Iran.

The Red Sea ports of Jeddah, King Abdullah and Dubai in Saudi Arabia offer meaningful capacity for domestic consumption but lack any rail connection between Jeddah and the capital of Riyadh. Construction has yet to begin on a planned 600-mile inland freight rail link, Hooper says, and containers must move hundreds of miles by truck. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq have no viable overland bypass routes that avoid either Hormuz or Saudi territory.

Transshipment disruption

Strait closure compounds port disruption with hub disruption. Jebel Ali’s 65% transshipment ratio means cargo losses extend well beyond UAE gateway trade. Gulf feeder services (1.2-1.5 million TEUs annually) to Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain can only operate if cargo is delivered to Jebel Ali via Khorfakkan/Fujairah (UAE)/Sohar.

Khalifa Port’s 65% transshipment ratio reflects a similar structural exposure. Abu Dhabi’s $1 billion investment attracting China’s Cosco and CMA CGM of France is now stranded. The sole bypass, Etihad Rail to Fujairah, provides only 50,000 TEU per year relief, forcing all relay transshipment to be moved to other regional hubs in the Mediterranean, Asia and Africa.

Three-stage outlook

Severe disruption is expected for up to six months, with only partial mitigation. While UAE and Saudi Arabia can partially re-route domestic cargo, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq face acute shortages with no adequate bypass. Food security and reefer cargo are critical stress points within weeks.

Over 6-24 months, adaptation is possible but economically devastating, Hooper says. Mitigation includes emergency investment at Khorfakkan and trucking-based landbridges via Sohar. Saudi rail upgrades will modestly expand volume, and air defense will be ramped up. Logistics costs across the Gulf are expected to rise by three to five times, leaving upper Gulf states fundamentally exposed.

24+ months: A prolonged closure will finally force Gulf governments into long-deferred, transformative investments (GCC Railway, Jeddah-Dammam-Kuwait rail corridor). Structural fixes are possible but slow; for instance, Duqm’s container hub is a 3-5-year project. Air defense will also become critical for regional logistics.

In total, Hooper says, collective underinvestment in Hormuz bypass despite clear risks means no combination of available bypass can fully substitute for Hormuz access in the short term. The region’s liner connectivity depth is its greatest strength – and, in a closure scenario, its greatest single point of failure.